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Abstract  
This paper aims to investigate and analyse the impact of the dowry and the endowment 
system on marriage and household patterns and on the labour market in 18thcentury Turin. At the 
same times it enquires into the reliability of the northern/southern Europe pattern for the study of 
this topic. Two points are developed. Firstly the paper shows that the dowry system coexists with a 
relatively high age at marriage because of the specific role played by the dowry in Turin society. 
Indeed, this was not a once-and-for-all established asset but was a negotiable and flexible resource 
that could be manipulated by the different actors concerned in the endowment. Moreover, the 
payment did not always take place immediately upon marriage, nor was the money quickly 
available. At the same time the paper examines the economic role of dowry in Ancien Régime 
households: by means of a juridical procedure couples could alienate this property, and use or invest 
it to ensure their well-being and/or their economic situation. Finally, the second part investigates the 
relationship between the dowry system and the participation of young girls and married women in 
the local labour market: their significant and crucial presence demonstrates that the dowry and its 
expectation was not a sufficient incentive to keep them out of the labour market.  
 
Keywords Dowry; Women Work; Marriage Patterns; South Europe Model; Servants; Italy 18th 
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1 Abbreviations : AST, Sez. Riun. = Archivio di Stato di Torino, Sezioni Riunite; AST, I Sez.= Archivio di Stato di 
Torino, I Sezione; AAT = Archivio Arcivescovile di Torino; ASCT = Archivio Storico del Comune di Torino. 
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 This paper aims to investigate and analyse the impact of the dowry and the endowment 
system on marriage and household patterns and on the labour market in 18thcentury Turin.The study 
of family and marriage patterns in pre-industrial Europe has a long historiographical tradition. In a 
famous article, Hajnal identified a European marriage pattern (EMP) – spreading to west of a line 
from Saint Petersburg to Trieste – characterized by late age at marriage and a high rate of celibacy 
(Hajnal 1965; Hajnal 1983). According to subsequent studies by Peter Laslett, this pattern was part 
of a more general European family model (specifically in north-western Europe), based on the 
predominance of the nuclear family, on the neolocality of the new couple and on the diffusion of 
life-cycle servanthood - a crucial experience for young people leaving home before the beginning of 
conjugal life and a practice that allowed individuals to delay their marriage (Laslett 1965, 1977; 
Laslett, & Wall 1972; Guttormsson 1988). Laslett also identified a “Mediterranean model” the 
features of which included, among others, the prevalence of complex households, early marriage of 
women, very low rates of permanent celibacy and low proportions of life-cycle servants (Laslett 
1983). These studies started a remarkable and successful debate involving demographers, historians 
and anthropologists, with some theoretical consequences for the approach to the European history 
of the family. This North/South dichotomy remains to this day an important model for analysis and 
has found favour with scholars. In a recent article, for example, David Reher (Reher 2004, pp. 52-
53) reasserts the methodological validity of this model for contemporary society and concludes that 
the life-cycle servanthood of North-West Europe encouraged a sense of individualism which, even 
today, still makes people face up to their responsibilities, while in the South risks and difficulties 
were (and are) shared by the family which plays the role of protector for their members until 
marriage and beyond. 
Using the same perspective, recent studies established a strong link between the EMP and 
Western Europe's economic development (for instance, De Moor, & Van Zanden 2010; De Vries 
1994). Tine De Moor and Jan Luiten Van Zanden, for example, argue that the EMP “emerged in 
north-western Europe because of a combination of three socio-economic and ideological factors: 
first, the stress on consensus instead of parental authority for the formation of a marriage; second, 
the position of women in the transfer of property between husband and wife and between parents 
and children; and third, the accessibility to, and size of, the labour market” (De Moor, & Van 
Zanden 2010, p.4). Undoubtedly, every one of these factors is worthy of analysis and discussion; 
nevertheless, it appears that the transfer of property – from parents to children and from bride to 
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groom – is considered the crucial element in understanding the rapid diffusion of the EMP in north-
western	 Europe as well as the consequent intense economic development of the area that took 
place from the medieval to the early modern period. As the authors clearly explain “the southern 
European system is often referred to as 'separatist' because the property of either spouse brought 
into the marriage was considered to be distinct, and a conjugal fund was not created at wedlock. 
The northern European situation is described as 'conjugal'. The property that a bride brought into 
the marriage was not held separately (…), but was instead merged into a communal account that 
was under the full control of the husband but to which the widow also had rights” (De Moor, & Van 
Zanden 2010, p. 8). 
 And of course these different conditions of property transfer could affect marriage patterns.   
Firstly, the authors claim that “there was probably a direct relationship between marriage age and 
the property transfer between parents and children (…). If a woman had the right to her parent's 
inheritance without having to marry [that was the most common case in north-western Europe] 
there was no financial incentive for an early marriage” (De Moor, & Van Zanden 2010, p. 9); 
rather, the necessity/will to amass resources with a view to marriage encouraged young, unmarried 
girls to delay their marriage and to choose the path of temporary service. In contrast, according to 
the authors, “the southern dowry system created incentives for both parents and girls to arrange 
early marriages” (De Moor, & Van Zanden 2010, p. 9).  
Secondly, the authors point out a specific relationship between the marital economy and 
female participation in the labour market. Indeed, in north-western Europe, the existence of a 
conjugal fund would stimulate the presence of women in the economy and in the labour market: 
“wives could contribute to their conjugal fund and profit from its growth”; in addition, they would 
contribute “to their future share of the inheritance in the knowledge that they would receive their 
share of the conjugal fund eventually” (De Moor, & Van Zanden 2010, p. 8). In the South, on the 
contrary, the endowment system would have kept women away from the labour market since their 
position would be more or less fixed by the presence of the dowry, “regardless of what economic 
activities they undertook” (De Moor, & Van Zanden 2010, p. 8). This would not have stimulated the 
entry of young girls into the labour market – because, in theory, they had no need to store up 
resources for marriage and they would acquire their share in the estate as a dowry. At the same 
time, married women – and then widows – would have had few opportunities (and little interest) “to 
take over their deceased husband's business because they did not necessarily receive a share of the 
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inheritance” (De Moor, & Van Zanden 2010, p. 10). In conclusion, these conditions would have 
permitted individuals and families to develop explicitly “labour-market oriented” strategies (De 
Moor, & Van Zanden 2010, p. 10) and that, in a long term perspective, enabled the rapid and great 
economic growth of the area.  
 At first glance, some features of the North/South dichotomy are not totally unrelated to some 
marriage and labour force behaviour – for example, the age of the bride and groom and the different 
rate of rural life-cycle servanthood in the two areas (Viazzo 2003) - or to systems of property 
transfer through the generations. Nevertheless, scholars supporting these theses limited their 
observations to specific regions, such as the South of Italy (“the deep south”); in addition they were 
obliged to admit numerous exceptions and never to clarify the real extent and the limits of 
applicability of this model. Thus, it appears that the “Mediterranean model” is not appropriate for 
describing the great regional variability of marriage and family patterns in southern Europe where, 
according to studies of the last two decades, factors can acquire different configurations and change 
rapidly across the regions and from city to countryside (Barbagli 1991; Kertzer, & Brettell 1987; 
Kertzer 1991; Cavallo 1998, 2006; Viazzo 2003). Also the longue durée of the model across the 
centuries and up to the present day proposed by Reher (Reher 2004) seems not to hold true in face 
of the great variation in contexts. Similarly, the economic and cultural meaning of inheritance 
system and endowment system as well as their consequences on the life of individuals and families 
could seriously change.  
For example, in the article by De Moor and Van Zanden, the dowry appears as a fixed and 
immobile property, strictly established once and for all by inheritance law, and intended to ensure 
powerful marriage alliances between families and to affect seriously and permanently the destiny of 
a woman. This may be the case in Renaissance Tuscany – to which the authors refer - but there is 
no evidence to suggest that this situation was widespread in all Mediterranean Europe (whose 
borderline remains blurred) or through the centuries. For this reason it may be interesting and useful 
to investigate the connections between the dowry system, marriage patterns and the participation of 
women in the labour market, by means of a case-study – namely Turin in the second half of the 18th 
century - in order to verify the pertinence of the North/South dichotomy as an analytical framework 
for the understanding of social and economic dynamics. Two points will be developed. Firstly, the 
local marriage pattern will be discussed and subsequently its relationship with the endowment 
system. In some ways, the Turin case-study is representative of the difficulty of applying the 
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northern/southern Europe model and of the risk of simplification it causes: even the marriage 
pattern of middle and lower classes was characterized by late marriage age, weddings were always 
completed by an endowment act. In addition, terms and conditions of dowry and of its payment 
were more complex than those established by law and were usually influenced by local coutume. 
Even if by that time the dowry was in most cases the female inheritance portion of the family estate, 
the concrete transfer of property did not always take place immediately upon marriage, nor was the 
money quickly available to the couple. This paper will also discuss the practical employment of the 
dowry in the household economy: it will be shown how couples alienated and made use of it – or, 
more frequently, a part of it - in order to assure their survival, to acquire employment or to achieve 
upward social mobility. Thus, in specific contexts the dowry was a negotiable and flexible resource 
that could be manipulated by the different actors involved in the endowment. In conclusion, the first 
part of the paper suggests that the dowry system was not sufficient in itself to incentivise early 
marriage or to determine a priori a girl’s destiny.   
 Secondly the paper investigates the relationship between dowry and labour market. In 
particular, it will be shown that the separate property regime (the dowry system) did not have 
negative effects on the presence of women in the labour market. Very often in the middle and lower 
classes the dowry consisted of the earnings and savings of the girl, or at least of a combination of 
sums of different origin in which the money earned by the bride was quite significant. Furthermore 
the difficulty in obtaining the dowry-heritage and the delay in payment even after the marriage 
encouraged young girls and married women to develop (or continue) other family survival 
strategies, such as entering the labour market, and even developing high-level skills, in order to 
assure incomes.   
From a methodological perspective, the paper suggests the importance and the fertility of a 
micro-analytical approach as well as a situational analysis of phenomena in order to grasp the 
relevance of social and economic dynamics. In this way, by means of the analysis and the 
valorisation of local differences and similarities of the crucial factors capable of explaining different 
situations and phenomena, it will be possible to avoid the risk of generalization caused by a rigid 
application of the northern/southern Europe model. Indeed, differences in family formation were 
not the result of two cultural and socio-economic blocks, which existed a priori, but rather, of 
different ways of obtaining and of managing resources intended to assure the formation and 
sustenance of a new household.  
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The paper is organized as follows. The first part describes the marriage pattern and the 
endowment system in 18th century Turin with the goal of evaluating its impact on the household 
economy. In particular the paper investigates how couples employed the dowry in everyday life by 
means of the alienazioni dotali. The paper also will show how, in some cases, it was difficult to 
obtain the actual payment of the dowry and, how the alienazioni dotali were a legal way to facilitate 
access to this property, promised and never paid. Finally, the second part enquires into the 
relationship between the endowment system and the presence of women in the Turin labour market.  
 
1. Marriage patterns 
 One essential point about the EMP concerns the age at first marriage; starting from a large 
range of studies, Hajnal and others concluded that the average age of spouses in western Europe 
was always 24 and over (Hajnal 1965). Available data for 18th century Turin falls in line with that 
shown by Hajnal and Laslett's research. In a sample of 286 processicoli matrimoniali2 registered 
from 1760 to 1792 in the Turin parish of Santi Processo e Martiniano, the average age at the first 
marriage (all social groups included) was 24.1 for brides and 28.7 for grooms. According to civil 
marriage acts set up during the period of the Napoleonic invasion of Italy, between 1803 and 1814, 
it was 24.4 for brides and 30 for grooms3.  
 Hajnal and Laslett's statements referred mainly to the countryside, but as has been 
suggested, the situation in towns and cities was more stratified with different types of urban 
economies across various social groups (Lynch 1991). If we consider the social and economic 
background of the brides in turn, some remarkable differences in marriage age emerge. For 
example, brides involved in crafts married at 24; but their age rises to 26.3 for women in retail and 
trade and reaches 28.3 and 28.7 respectively among brides are that stated to be well-off (benestanti 
or redditiere) and among others who declared a service activity, (as servants, housekeepers, cooks, 
laundresses)4. The social and economic environment of women also seems to play a role in the 
likelihood of permanent celibacy; according to the population census, more than 55 per cent of 
                                               
2 The processicoli matrimoniali were set up by the catholic authorities with the goal of certifying the civil status of 
the spouses and verifying that they fulfilled all the necessary requirements to enter into wedlock. AAT, Fondi 
Parrocchiali, Sezione XVIII. 
3 ASCT, Atti di matrimonio, vol. 1-16. Civil marriage acts of the Napoleonic age were transcribed partly by a team of 
students from the Department of Economic History at the University of Turin, coordinated by Prof. Maria Carla 
Lamberti and partly by Prof. Luciano Allegra. I thank them for allowing me to use the complete database. 
4 Source : my elaboration from civil marriage acts of Napoleonic age. 
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unmarried women aged over 30 were involved in service activity, 23 per cent in craft and only 2 per 
cent in retail. 
 A second factor was crucial in affecting the marriage pattern in Old Regime Turin: the 
migration experience. During the century, Turin grew rapidly and, as in other European cities, 
migration was a structural feature of this development. In the second half of the 18th century, 
migrants (people not born in the city) accounted for up to 60 per cent of the male population 
between 26 and 60 years old and 44 per cent of the female population between 15 and 40 years old5; 
they arrived from the countryside and the mountains around the city, attracted to the labour market 
of the capital. People who definitely wanted to settle in the city were obliged to reorganize their 
social and working life and to network in the new milieu and in this context one of the most evident 
consequences was the delay of marriage. Indeed, in Turin, as in many other European cities, 
migrants of both sexes also married later than their peers born in the city (Brodsky Elliot 1981; 
Bardet 1983; Poussou 1983; De Vries 1984). This delay is of course a significant proof of the effort 
required by new residents to settle into the new situation and, as Jan de Vries wrote, “may also 
reflect the existence of differences in the size of obstacles that stand in the way of establishing the 
economic basis for marriage” (De Vries 1984, p. 192), such as the labour market niches that 
migrants were likely to occupy. 
 The sample of 286 marriages shows that in the second half of the 18th century, native girls 
celebrated their first marriage at 22.9 years old on average while migrant brides were older (25.8 on 
average). In addition, while 75 per cent of the natives were from 16 to 25 years old, migrant brides 
were only 54 per cent in the same age cohort as they married frequently (more than 35 per cent) 
between 26 and 35 years old. Results are analogous for men: native men married for the first time at 
27.6 while immigrants married at 29.6; and about 40 per cent of the latter were in the age cohort age 
from 26 to 306. 
  
2. Endowment system and inheritance pattern in 18th century Turin 
Research on Renaissance Tuscany showed that there was a direct correlation between age at 
marriage and the amount of the dowry (Herlihy 1976; Herlihy, & Klapish-Zuber 1978; Botticini 
1999); similarly, De Moor and Van Zanden (De Moor, & Van Zanden 2010) concluded that, in 
southern Europe where the dowry system was widespread, this allowed – and even encouraged – 
                                               
5 Source : my elaboration from the population census of 1802. 
6 AAT, Fondi Parrocchiali, Sezione XVIII. My elaboration from the processicoli matrimoniali. 
8 
 
marriage at a young age. This clearly refers to a specific context, such as the Tuscan society of the 
Quattrocento; 18th century Turin is not part of this model since late marriages were affected by 
different factors not considered for Tuscan society – such as migration and the employment 
experiences of spouses – and coexisted with an endowment system which, as will be explained in 
the following chapters, did not assure a direct and simple access to dowry but incentivised, and even 
compelled, girls to delay marriage and to participate actively in the labour market.  
Since the Middle Ages and until the 19th century at least, in countries employing Roman law 
the dowry was indispensable for girls of every social group in order to enter the marriage market. 
The dowry was usually drawn up by a notary’s deed – the endowment act – signed by the bride, the 
groom, and by their parents or relatives7. In 18th century Turin, the dowry was composed of two 
parts: a sum of money, usually paid in cash or with a credit or a private deed (or more rarely with a 
house or land), and goods – clothes, linen, furniture, jewels – known as the “marriage trousseau” 
(fardello in the Piedmontese dialect). Often, amongst the lower classes, the dowry was made up 
exclusively of these goods, while the cash part was lacking. According to the law and customs of 
the Kingdom of Sardinia8, the dowry and the trousseau were the personal property of the bride; 
nevertheless, during married life, they were put under the control of the husband who had 
ownership and the right to manage them for the well-being of the family. Despite this, and in order 
to protect female property rights, as a general rule the dowry was inalienable. When the husband 
died, the dowry was returned to the widow by the husband's heir(s); then, during widowhood, the 
woman had the right to control and freely manage it. Of course, the value of the dowry as well as 
the origin of the money or goods allocated varied according to the social status of the family and its 
ambitions; in 18th century Turin most dowries were valued at up to 500 lire. According to a sample 
of 753 Catholic dowries established here throughout the 18th century, 50.34 per cent were worth up 
to 499 lire and 17.55 per cent between 500 and 999 lire (Allegra 1996, p. 177).  
   The dowry was undoubtedly closely connected to the inheritance system and often paid as 
the inheritance portion tout court. According to Diane Owen Hughes's famous article (Owen 
Hughes 1978), the Old Regime dowry system was the result of extensive and meaningful changes in 
inheritance systems that took place at the end of the Middle Ages and which continued into Early 
                                               
7 Particularly, on Turin and Piedmont see: (Pene Vidari 1980-81;1983). 
8 Since the 16th century Turin and the Piedmont were part of the Dukedom of Savoy. After the conclusion of the War 
of the Spanish Succession and as a consequence of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), the Dukedom of Savoy became 
firstly the Kingdom of Sicily and some years later, in 1720, the Kingdom of Sardinia.  
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Modern western Europe. During this period, a patrilineal inheritance system spread; families started 
to privilege a transfer of goods and estates towards male heirs, while daughters, and more generally 
females, were excluded from the family inheritance. In order to balance the loss of these rights, 
dowry – in use since the time of Roman civilisation – was paid as an inheritance portion; when 
obtaining a dowry, daughters were obliged to renounce formally all other inheritance rights. This 
was also, at least in theory, the situation in the Kingdom of Sardinia during the 18th century. The 
Constitutional Charter (the Regie Costituzioni), enacted in 1729, stated that «in order to promote the 
pride and honour of families, every girl to whom was formally constituted, or paid, or promised , an 
appropriate dowry [‘una dote congrua’] be excluded from other inheritance rights by means of said 
dowry» (Duboin 1818-1869, pp. 218-219)9. Thus, the dowry was considered the girl’s inheritance 
right from the whole family estate. According to the law, an appropriate dowry was a sum adequate 
to the social rank of the family and the bride. Clearly, the priority of the law was to protect and to 
assure the unity and continuity of the great estates of aristocratic and wealthy families; nevertheless, 
in the 18th century this principle was a commonly accepted fact in all social groups, as notarial 
deeds testify. Despite this, as will be explained in the following chapters, endowment practices were 
the result of more complex dynamics and were also shaped by important factors – such as the 
identity, the economic and social background of the people involved, and timing and delay in 
payment – until now neglected by scholars. 
 
2.2 Who paid the dowry? And when? 
 The dowry as the female inheritance portion of the family estate – father's estate or mother's 
estate or both – was not the only possibility. The endowment was established by a range of actors 
and methods, depending on the social and economic context of the bride and groom and on the 
material and nonmaterial resources of the families. This means that the dowry was not always a 
certainty: amassing a dowry or waiting for it could take a while and oblige girls to delay marriage. 
In order to understand the complex dynamics and the plurality of factors involved, we focus on a 
sample of 261 endowment deeds signed in Turin between 1760 and 1785 and fully transcribed.  
 
 
                                               
9  «per la conservazione delle famiglie e il lustro dell’agnazione vogliamo che ogni femmina, alla quale sarà 
lasciata, promessa, o costituita una dote congrua, sì da di lei ascendenti paterni, o materni, che trasversali, s’intenda, 
mediante il pagamento di detta dote». Libro VI, titolo XIV: della successione degli agnati, ed esclusione delle femmine. 
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Tab. 1 Individuals formally involved in endowment (1760-
1780) 
  n. % 
father (alive) of the bride 76 29,1 
bride 63 24,1 
charity dowry 45 17,2 
      
relatives of the bride (tot 22,6%):     
brother 23 8,8 
brother + uncle (father's brother) 3 1,1 
mother 8 3,1 
brother + mother 7 2,7 
uncle (father's brother or mother's brother) 4 1,5 
aunt (father's sister or mother's sister) 3 1,1 
other relatives or groups of relatives 11 4,2 
      
made up by different actors (charity dowry + other 
sums) 6 2,3 
groom 3 1,1 
unknown 9 3,4 
      
tot 261 100 
 
 
As shown in table 1, when alive, the bride's father had a leading role in endowment (76 
notarial deeds, equal to about 30 per cent). Also other members of the kinship network were 
important (they account for more than 22 per cent). Two reasons explain their presence. If the father 
and/or mother were alive at the time of the marriage, they could establish and pay a dowry directly. 
Otherwise, if they were deceased, they could prescribe by will to leave a sum that must be expressly 
paid by the universal heir (or heirs) to the daughter. This explains, for example, the presence of the 
bride's brothers and uncles (to which one can add the bride's widowed mother in her capacity as 
tutor). Indeed, in 18thcentury Turin, a patrilineal logic in inheritance systems was found in male and 
female wills of all social groups; and usually the universal heir was a male member of the family. 
But members of the family could take part in the endowment not only in compliance with the last 
will of a relative but also in their private capacity and by way of familial solidarity. Thanks to their 
bequests by will, or gifts when alive, uncles, aunts and grandparents could help a poor girl to 
acquire the indispensable prerequisite to marriage. Furthermore, since the dowry really was 
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indispensable for a girl, in Catholic countries “charity dowries” (doti elemosinarie) paid by 
charitable institutions or individuals were also very widespread (17 per cent of the whole sample)10, 
while a dowry paid by the groom was quite exceptional, though not impossible (1.2 per cent). 
Finally, the dowry could be established by the girl herself; depending on the situation, the capital 
came from her inheritance rights on her parents' estate or from her work and earnings. In the sample 
here analysed, for example, 11 girls out of 63 explicitly claimed that their dowry was the result “of 
their labour”. I shall return to this important point in a following chapter, when the relationship 
between the dowry system and the labour market will be discussed. Here it is important to 
emphasise that the data shows the plurality of actors involved in endowment; thus the endowment 
does not appear as such a linear and direct transition from parents to daughter but a wider “family or 
community affair”. As a result, very often the dowry was a composite of different sums. According 
to the endowment act of Francesca Alloi, for example, set up in 1775, the dowry is composed of 
230 lire – coming from her father's and mother's inheritances and from an uncle’s bequest – plus 
another 720 lire – saved up while working as a femme de chambre at the house of Earl Osello di 
Nichelino11. At the same time, in 1762, Teresa Vittonetto's dowry amounts to 400 lire, 200 coming 
from the father's will and 200 from her work as faseuse (bonnet-maker)12.   
 But a second aspect of the dowry prevents us from easily claiming that the dowry system 
was an economic incentive for girls to get married young: the timing, terms and conditions of 
payment. These factors have seldom been taken into account by scholars, but according to my 
research they are really crucial points in order to grasp endowment dynamics13. In 18th century 
Turin, the wedding ceremony, the formal establishment of the dowry by notarial deed, and the 
payment of the sum, hardly ever took place at the same time. In the sample under analysis, 131 
dowry acts – equal to 50 per cent of the whole sample (261) – were signed after the celebration of 
the marriage. For about a third of them (38 out of 131) the wedding took place at least one year 
earlier, and in some cases even 8, 9, or more than 10 years earlier. Furthermore, things were no 
easier as regards payment, as shown in table 2.  
 
                                               
10 On the topic see: (D'Amelia 1990) and (Groppi 1994). Of course charity dowries, too, were often just a component 
of the overall dowry and combined with sums offered by members of the family, patrons and even by neighbours. 
But in Turin very often the charity dowry deed was dressed up by the notary of the institution that paid the dowry; 
thus other sums were not declared by the bride at that moment. 
11 AST, Sez. Riun., Insinuazione di Torino, a. 1775, l. 5, ff. 1336r-1338r. 
12 AST, Sez. Riun., Insinuazione di Torino, a. 1762, l. 4, ff. 749r-750v. 
13 For important remarks on the topic see: (Scardozzi 1998).  
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Tab. 2 Terms and conditions of payment of the dowries 
    % 
payment deferred until the future 28 10,7 
full payment at the moment of the signing of the dowry act 137 52,5 
portion of payment in the past + portion of payment at the 
endowment act 10 3,8 
full payment already made in the past 29 11,1 
portion of payment at the moment of the endowment act + portion 
promised in the future  30 11,5 
unknown 27 10,3 
      
total 261 100,0 
  
 
More than 52 per cent of couples (137 cases) received the dowry at the time of the signing of the 
act, before the notary. This percentage decreases if we do not take into account the charity dowries 
(which were always paid at the moment the notarial deed was signed) and the dowries consisting of 
the girl’s savings (which was of course immediately available). At the opposite end, another 10 per 
cent of couples signed the dowry act but did not receive the money at all; rather, they got an official 
promise of payment or a private credit deed while the cash was delayed until some future time. On 
the other hand, 11 per cent of couples had already obtained the whole sum prior to the wedding 
ceremony, and in this case, the notarial deed was just to formalize something which had already 
happened. Finally, for another 14 per cent of the couples, payment was delayed and made in several 
steps; 11.5 per cent of them got a portion of the dowry at the signing of the deed but were obliged to 
wait for the remaining sum; only 3 per cent had already obtained the first portion in the past and the 
second portion at the moment of the notarial deed.  
 Two reasons for these delays can be shown. First of all, in some cases, this was a 
precautionary measure, intended to protect female property against bad administration or economic 
wastefulness on the part of the husband. For this reason, for example, the father of Francesca 
Maritano, a silk dyer, declared that the dowry “will be paid only when the couple have a stable and 
secure occupation”14. Until that moment the 3,315 lire would be held by the bride's father. Indeed, 
the person charged with paying the dowry was also considered legally responsible for it and if his 
evaluation of the husband's capacity or honesty was wrong, he risked having to pay a second dowry. 
On the other hand, for many families endowment was an economic strain and in a situation of 
                                               
14 AST, Sez. Riun., Insinuazione di Torino, l. 4, a. 1760, ff. 1065r-v. 
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penury it was difficult to put together quickly a sum as large as a dowry. When the payment was 
delayed, it was often after the death of the father and/or the mother (or whatever other relatives 
were involved). In these cases, the dowry was in the charge of the sole heir(s); but the problem is 
that, in many situations, payment was not immediately assured, even by the heir(s). Indeed, as post-
mortem inventories reveal, the family inheritance could be heavily burdened with debts and the only 
heir left in financial straits. 
 In conclusion, this evidence shows that we should avoid considering the dowry as an estate 
immediately available upon marriage. Waiting times could be long. The data shows that for a not 
inconsiderable proportion of couples, the formal endowment did not imply a prompt payment of the 
dowry, but dealt with different formal and informal actions over long lapses of time and it could 
concern several members of the family and even different generations. As a consequence, the dowry 
frequently remained an unpaid credit of the bride to her husband and her family. Moreover, when 
delays passed from one generation to another the heir (or the heirs), were not always ready to pay 
the cash.  
 
3. The“alienazioni dotali”  
 According to previous studies, the amount of dowry a family could provide was revealing 
about its social position and its ambitions for social mobility (Herlihy 1976; Klapish-Zuber 1990; 
Molho 1994; Bellavitis 2001). Thus, a very large dowry was considered indispensable in order to 
assure good marriage opportunities and to build up alliances with the most wealthy and influential 
families in society. On the contrary, an inadequate dowry obliged the family and the bride to find a 
groom in a lower social group. For the same reason, a groom from a family involved in the process 
of impoverishment or loss of social rank was obliged to settle for a girl from a lower social group 
and to accept a more modest dowry. In spite of the importance of these results, which emphasise the 
relationship between the dowry and the social and economic position of the family, research has 
neglected to pay attention to its economic role or to its practical role in married life (with the 
exception of: Owen Hughes 1975; Fazio 1992; Lanaro, & Varanini 2009). This point will be 
discussed in the following chapter. Indeed, even though the dowry was an inalienable estate by law, 
in 18th century Turin couples could remove this constraint by a juridical procedure and a civil trial 
known as alienazione dotale. For this reason, it is possible to argue that the dowry was not a fixed 
property intended to be conserved and transmitted over the generations and to be used only to 
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assure the survival of the widow but, on the contrary, that it was a genuine and concrete resource for 
the household economy, to be spent or invested. 
 Since Roman times, the dowry had been inalienable female property, even if, as declared in 
the Emperor Justinian's civil code, it was intended for the economic sustenance of the family (“ad 
sustinenda onera matrimonii”). However, its inalienability was little by little called into question 
during the Middle Ages. In many areas of Italy, the impact of Lombard law promoted the diffusion 
of a dos aestimata, that is a dowry paid in cash and by goods other than lands or other real estate. 
This transformation opened the way for the cash dowry and, of course, for the possibility of its 
alienation (Bellomo 1961). During the 18th century, in the Kingdom of Sardinia, the couple had the 
right to sell the dowry – or a part of it – or to obtain its payment rapidly in cash. According to the 
Regie Costituzioni, this was permitted in a situation of economic difficulties, for the advantage of 
the members of the family, to free someone imprisoned for debts, in order to support a familial 
economic activity, such as a craft atelier or a shop or, as a general rule, in order to assure the 
sustenance of the family (“il sostentamento della famiglia”) (Duboin 1818-1869, pp. 398-411)15. 
Alienation of the dowry was possible through a civil procedure; couples had to address the civil 
courts of the city, for example the Senato di Piemonte – the supreme court of the state where the 
judges were Senators of the Kingdom – or the Giudicatura, the most popular civil court, active in 
all the cities of the Kingdom. To open a civil procedure of alienazione dotale, couples sent the King 
a plea; they outlined the terms and conditions of the endowment, the motivations for the request and 
the economic situation of the family. Once the royal patent had been obtained, couples went to trial 
and, before the judge, they had to present witnesses and proofs. Finally, if the judgement was 
positive, they obtained the dowry in cash from the creditor or they sold the goods and/or the estate. 
At the end of the procedure new notarial deeds were set up. Then the trial documents and the deeds 
were conserved in the archives of the notaries employed at the courts. In this research I set up a 
sample of 188 trials held in Turin, at the Giudicatura, between 1765 and 1780, a period during 
which this kind of juridical procedure was widespread and well known. For example, the notary-
chief of the Giudicatura, Gio' Batta Franco, registered more than 34 alienazioni on average over 
these years, with peaks of 46-48. In order to grasp how the dowry was employed in daily life and 
how this could contribute to economic development, the following points will be discussed: 1) the 
                                               
15 Lib. VI, Tit. XXIII, Dell'alienazione de' beni de' minori, delle femmine ed altre persone e corpi privilegiati.  
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reason why the dowry was sold and used; 2) the social and professional positions of couples who 
required alienation. 
 
3.1 A flexible household resource: economic use of the dowry and family life-cycle 
 According to previous research, alienation of the dowry was an expression of the husband’s 
marital authority and his control over his wife’s property. The dowry was often sold by the husband 
in order to pay his creditors, that is, for his personal interest and not for the advantage and the well-
being of the whole family. The husband exploited his wife's capital in order to remedy the results of 
bad management, bankruptcy or business difficulties. Thus, alienation of the dowry represented the 
greatest danger to female property (Fazio 1996; Scardozzi 1998, p. 101). 
In spite of the historiographical relevance of this approach, my research shows the crucial role 
played by alienation of the dowry in assuring the survival – and even the social and economic 
mobility – of Turin families during the 18th century. Let us consider, for example, the reasons that 
compelled couples to sell this property. According to the law, in the notarial deed set up after the 
judge's decree, the couple was obliged to pay off its debts; acts are rich in detail and the name of the 
creditors, the reasons for the debts and the amounts were recorded. If there were no creditors, the 
couple kept the entire dowry. In the sample considered here, one third of the couples involved in 
alienation – 57 alienation procedures out of a total of 188 – obtained the money but did not use it at 
all. On the other hand, the remaining couples (131) employed the dowry money immediately, as 
shown in table 3.  
 
 
Tab 3. Debts paid off by the couples immediately after dowry alienation 
decree  (131 cases out of 188), 1760-1780 
    % 
purchase of a craft shop/inn/retail shop; purchase of goods and items 
for a craft shop/inn/retail shop* 55 42,0 
house rents in arrears 46 35,1 
money loans from individuals 40 30,5 
purchase of foodstuffs 21 16,0 
money loans from Jewish pawnshops ("banchi feneratizi") 20 15,3 
purchase of furniture, clothes 12 9,2 
medicines 8 6,1 
surgeon 3 2,3 
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apprenticeship 2 1,5 
money loans from Catholic pawnshops "Monti di Pietà" 2 1,5 
wetnurse 2 1,5 
payment of local fees 2 1,5 
creditors of the husband 1 0,8 
* in 4 cases, goods and items were expressely bought in order to supply the 
wife's retail shop or craft activity  
 
 
 
The main goal of alienation was to make a direct contribution to the economic establishment 
and development of the household. In 55 cases out of 133 (equal to 42 per cent), couples used the 
dowry to take over or open a shop/inn or to pay suppliers for goods or items for their commercial 
activity. We can consider, for example, the case of Domenico Riccio and his wife Benedetta Novo. 
In March 1780 they bought up an inn (« un negozio di osteria ») priced at 810 lire and 6 soldi from 
Giuseppe Simonda and Gioanni Toso. The couple paid 30 lire immediately, and two months later 
asked for the alienation of Benedetta’s dowry. Thanks to this, they obtained 750 lire and paid off 
the inn16. The same arises from the case of Michele Vigada and his wife Francesca. In April 1770, 
Michele took over a distillery and a shop selling homemade candies and preserves, priced at 6,000 
lire. Michele paid 4,500 lire immediately, and two months later he added another 2,000 lire, the 
amount of his wife’s alienated dowry17. In both situations, the short delay between the purchase of 
the inn/shop and the procedure of alienation highlights the strategic use of the dowry.  
Although access to the labour market was the most important reason for selling the dowry, 
there were of course other pressing causes, more directly connected with the survival of the family. 
More than 37 per cent of the households (62 in all) needed to pay back money to private creditors or 
to redeem clothes, linens and jewels from the city’s pawnshops (the Jewish banchi feneratizi and 
the Catholic Monti di Pietà). Charges and daily expenses for survival were also reasons for selling 
the dowry; more than 35 per cent of couples had to pay house rent arrears, while more than 25 per 
cent were obliged to buy foodstuffs, clothes and furniture on credit. A minority used the dowry to 
pay a surgeon, or for some medicines or for a wet nurse or for an apprenticeship for their children, 
while in one case only was the money explicitly used to liquidate the husband’s debts. Clearly, in 
                                               
16 AST, Sez. Riun., Notai di Torino, I versamento, vol. 2777, ff. 349r-359v. 
17 AST, Sez. Riun., Notai di Torino, I versamento, vol. 2754.1, ff. 449r-461v.  
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some situations, debts and funds for craft or commercial activities could overlap and the dowry was 
used for both. But what about couples without creditors to reimburse immediately after the 
alienation? We cannot exclude the possibility that they had debts and creditors or invested the 
dowry somewhere even if this does not appear in the deeds18; secondly, as will be shown in the 
following chapter, the fact that some couples did not make any direct investment suggests that this 
procedure was also a legal expedient in order to obtain the payment of the dowry which was still in 
the hands of the family of the bride. 
Evidence of the main role of the dowry – though not the only one – as a resource that could 
allow the economic establishment of the couple and its access to local economic activity is also 
provided by the couple’s social and economic background as well as by the phase of the life-cycle 
in which the dowry was alienated. According to the sample, husbands were mostly concentrated in 
artisanal and commercial activities. They were shoemakers, tailors, distillers, wig-makers, tanners, 
goldsmiths; they were merchants, retailers, shopkeepers and innkeepers; they traded in textiles – 
especially in silks, clothes, bonnets, trimmings, leather goods and foodstuffs. Of course, other jobs 
and professions were concerned too. Their presence as domestics, waiters, cooks and porters was 
notable, as well as soldiers. Finally, there were lawyers, notaries, employees, penmen, and only one 
nobleman19. Concerning women’s work, we can find all the typical female jobs and occupations of 
the Old Regime: they were seamstresses, waitresses and they ran little food retailers.  
In their pleas, couples described in detail the terms of the endowment; thus, we can carefully 
establish a correlation between the beginning of married life and the moment at which the spouses 
decided to sell and actually use these assets. Considering only couples applying for the first time – 
103 cases out of 188 – three different patterns can be discerned:  
- more than a half of the couples (46 cases) had been married for between 5 and 15 years; 
- 22 couples had been married for more than 15 years; 
- 15 couples had been married for between 1 and 2 years20. 
                                               
18 In order to verify this hypothesis I researched some of these couples in the notarial registers of Turin, without result 
so far. 
19 In the case of these professions and social groups, the objective of alienation was mainly to pay off debts. In 
addition, the limited presence of couples from the aristocracy or from the higher social groups of the city does not 
mean that they did not ask for dowry alienation; because of the considerable values involved, they were obliged to 
address their pleas to the Senato of Piedmont, where, indeed, we can find their civil trials. See for example : AST, 
Sez. Riun., Senato di Piemonte, Alienazioni dotali. 
20 For 20 couples at the first alienation procedure, the data is not sufficient to describe their marriage and endowment 
patterns. 
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          In the first case, it appears that 25 couples out of 46 have children and babies, and one wife 
declares that she is pregnant; in addition, more than 70% of them have debts. Here alienation of the 
dowry was clearly set up in order to allow families to bear up in a difficult phase of their life-cycle. 
Thus, when the household resources were not sufficient to assure the survival of all the members of 
the family, the dowry was a strategic choice. Secondly, 22 couples asked for alienation in another 
crucial phase of the life-cycle, that is more than 15 years after the beginning of their married life. 
This pattern concerns older or ageing couples; in this case alienation aims to assure the survival of 
the couple no longer able to work. On the contrary, if we turn our attention towards recently 
married couples (15), we discover that alienation was mostly connected with the need to take over 
or buy a shop or an inn or to provide a retail or craft shop with supplies. In this case, the dowry was 
a long term investment intended to assure the future – and prosperity – of the new household. The 
already cited Michele Vigada and his wife Francesca, for example, stayed all their life in the 
distillery and candy shop, for more than 20 years. In the craft tax roll of 1792, Michele, by that time 
master, has a journeyman in his workshop, and in 1802, aged 71, he still works and has four 
children21. In conclusion, the analysis shows that alienation of the dowry was prompted by different 
family strategies; the decision to ask for alienation and to go to trial was determined by the phase of 
the household life-cycle and by economic circumstances and demographic events. Moreover, since 
the dowry was directly employed to improve the family’s access to the labour market or to its well-
being, it played a crucial role in economic development and growth. Thus, the dowry was really a 
flexible resource and not only capital intended to be maintained and transmitted across generations.  
 
3.2 Alienating the dowry in order to obtain it: a strategic mechanism for the family   
Some important details suggest also another use of alienation: it could be used by the couple 
as a strategic way to simply obtain payment of the dowry in cash, and thus to freely manage it, even 
if there were no pressing debtors or imminent investments, as 57 couples of the 188 did. Indeed, as 
previously explained, dowry payments were very often delayed; in this sense, alienation can be 
interpreted as a legal and efficacious way to obtain in cash a dowry that risked being always 
promised but never paid. This comes out in the expressions and words used by the spouses in the 
plea. Gio' Battista Mocaglieri and Felice Rosalia, for example, explained that in the endowment  
                                               
21 Sources : AST, I Sez., Materie Economiche, Commercio, Cat. I, mazzo 2°, I addizione, “Volume contente li nomi, 
cognomi e patria de' mastri e padroni e de' loro rispettivi lavoranti ed apprendizzi delli arti e mestieri”; population 
census of Turin 1802. 
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act, established in November 1751, the bride’s brother, Francesco Antonio, promised the payment 
of a dowry of 728 lire within one year. Nevertheless, three years later the dowry had not yet been 
paid and thus, in 1754, the spouses asked to alienate half of it. In other words, by means of the 
alienazione dotale procedure, they obliged Felice Rosalia's brother to pay. Furthermore, 12 years 
later, they had not yet received the second half of the estate, and therefore they again claimed for it 
by means of alienation. Of course, Gio' Battista and Felice Rosalia also had other reasons to 
alienate; for example, they had several debts for foodstuffs and for their baby’s wet-nurse, while 
Gio' Battista had a modest income as a blacksmith22. But, of course, different strategies could 
overlap and a situation of lack of cash and of debts could be transformed into an opportunity to 
settle other issues, such as the definitive payment of the dowry. The same arises from the case of 
Bernardo and Lucia Schira. They obtained permission to alienate their dowry, valued at 200 lire, in 
1770, about 3 years after the notarial deed, signed by the bride's father and not yet paid23. In this 
situation, the need to build up a brazier fund was also the occasion to obtain the dowry in cash from 
Lucia’s father. 
Archival sources do not reveal whether there was any opposition from the family of the 
bride or from the person charged with paying the dowry, who were clearly often hostile to an 
immediate payment just after the marriage, and temporized because the husband had to demonstrate 
that he had sufficient property or a secure job to offer as insurance for the dowry, or, alternatively, 
that he had the means to transform it into a safe investment. At the same time fathers, brothers, 
brothers-in-law, uncles and nephews were often called as witnesses to the condition of neediness 
and to the future good use of the estate, in other words, in favour of alienation. Thus, we can 
possibly speculate that for the people responsible for the dowry, this was a safe, official and legal 
way to discharge definitively their responsibilities for the administration of this female property 
before the courts. Finally, even though the law was not always explicit on this point and though the 
King or the judge only sometimes refers to it, the rights of the bride were not at all lost with the 
alienazione but were transferred to the family's new investment, guaranteed by the shop or the other 
venture acquired with the dowry money. In addition, in order to complete the procedure the formal 
agreement of the bride was explicitly requested and registered in the deeds by a formula. On the 
                                               
22 AST, Sez. Riun., Notai di Torino, I versamento, vol. 2750, ff. 23r-33r. 
23 AST, Sez. Riun., Notai di Torino, I versamento, vol. 2755, ff. 177r-183r. 
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other hand, the wife could not start the alienazione procedure without the agreement of her 
husband, since by law she was considered as a minor in legal matters24.     
 
4.  Women’s work, dowry and professional patterns 
 Let us now turn our attention to the second point under discussion: the relationship between 
the dowry system and the participation of women in the labour market. According to the research 
by Laslett and Hajnal, servanthood was a crucial feature of the EMP; it was a life-cycle event that 
took place in the early teenage years of boys and girls and finished with marriage, at a quite 
advanced age (Hajnal 1965; Laslett 1965, 1977; Laslett, & Wall 1972; Guttormsson 1988). 
According to Van Zanden and De Moor, life-cycle servanthood was “a particularly important 
source of female wage labour” (De Moor, & Van Zanden 2010, p. 11): during this period, girls 
saved and amassed money and goods with a view to future marriage, leading to a “market-oriented” 
behaviour in the young, closely connected with the economic development of north-western Europe 
(De Moor, & Van Zanden 2010, pp. 14-15). On the contrary, the low rate of life-cycle servanthood 
found in southern Europe led scholars to suggest that the dowry system did not stimulate women to 
enter into the labour market; the certainty of having a right to this estate was sufficient to persuade 
them that their future condition and well-being were already decided. For the young girls of 
Renaissance Tuscany the expectation of a dowry – that was higher, the younger the girl (Botticini 
1999) - coming from the family, did not encourage them to work or to do anything to accumulate 
resources for marriage. Similarly, married women were not attracted to the labour market because 
of the lack of a conjugal fund and in the case of future widowhood, their economic resources were 
already more or less fixed by the dowry. 
As has already been shown, in 18th century Turin long delays in payment, or the hesitancy or 
financial difficulties of families obliged the girl to “earn” her dowry or to wait for it for a while and 
this of course not only did not encourage early marriages but was the impetus for a widespread 
participation by women in the local labour market. In the following chapters, we will concentrate 
firstly on the work of young girls and we will then investigate the role of married women. Research 
findings about Italian servanthood are much debated questions because of the complexity and 
variability of local situations from north to south of the peninsula, and also from city to countryside. 
                                               
24 We cannot evaluate the percentage of cases in which the alienation was granted or not because notarial archives only 
store successful pleas. Nevertheless, we know that it was rejected if the wife appeared without her husband, as we 
can read in the pleas of couples asking twice or three times. 
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Hajnal and Laslett's data concerned the countryside but rural servanthood was less important in 
Italy where the predominant small landed estate did not require servant labour25. On the contrary, 
research reveals a specific Italian (and maybe European) urban pattern – a point that has not been 
considered sufficiently in the application of the northern/southern European model: since the 16th 
century servants and domestics were concentrated in cities where they worked for the noble families 
and socio-economic elites. They were mainly unmarried women and men, aged over 30 years old, 
with a long experience of loyalty and service (Arru 1990, 1992; Sarti 2005, pp. 420-421) ; long co-
residence with the master discouraged marriages (or compelled its postponement for a while). In 
addition, as shown by other research, in specific contexts – such as in Renaissance Tuscany or 17th 
and 18th century southern Italy - female servanthood was the object of social condemnation since it 
endangered the girl's honour (Klapish-Zuber 1986, 1992; Chabot 1990; Da Molin 1990, p. 521). In 
conclusion, for all these reasons domestic service in Italy was for both men and women an all-life 
condition and not a transitory one destined to be abandoned at marriage. 
 Data concerning 18th century Turin also reflects this specific urban servanthood pattern. 
Since the end of the 16th century, Turin had been the capital of the Dukedom of Savoy and later of 
the Kingdom of Sardinia. The royal court, the aristocracy, the officials and the wealthy merchant 
families were established there; thus, the demand for servants, domestics, waiters and waitresses, 
femmes de chambre and governesses remained high throughout the century. According to the 
population census, carried out in 180226, servants and domestics of different levels and ranks made 
up about 9 per cent of the total number of inhabitants (rising to 10.2 if we consider only the active 
population over 10 years old). This percentage probably underestimates the real importance of the 
phenomenon; indeed, the population census was carried out after the invasion of the Napoleonic 
army and the annexation of the Kingdom of Sardinia to France, at the end of a period of war. These 
dramatic events compelled people to leave the city, and moreover local elites, with whom domestic 
service was closely connected, were threatened by the arrival of French soldiers and the 
establishment of a new political regime. Instead, according to another source in the middle decades 
                                               
25 With some exceptions such as in the sharecropping system of the Toscana (mezzadria) (Viazzo 2003, p. 116). On 
the other hand, recent research demonstrates that Laslett's statements about the diffusion of life-cycle servanthood in 
north-western Europe should be seriously called into question and considered in conjunction with other factors 
(Mayhew 1991). For a comparison of the rate of servanthood in rural north-western and southern Europe see: (Reher 
2004, pp. 48-49). Data reported by Reher is not concerned specifically with urban servanthood, with the exception 
of four suburban parishes of Pisa. 
26 The population census of Turin was transcribed by a team of students from the Department of Economic History at 
the University of Turin, coordinated by Prof. Maria Carla Lamberti. I thank Prof. Lamberti for allowing me to use 
and search the complete database. 
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of the 18th century servants of both sexes were between 10 and 11 per cent of the population 
(Castiglioni 1862). Incidentally, these percentages are closer to those registered in other cities: in 
some 18th century Roman parishes, for example, servants were 10 per cent of the inhabitants (Arru 
1997, p. 110), in four suburban parishes of Pisa between 1656 and 1740 they accounted for 9.5 per 
cent (Reher 2004, p. 49), and in Florence in 1810 for 14 per cent (Gozzini 1989, p. 163). Data are 
similar in a wider European context: in 1695 servants were 8.10 per cent of the population of Aix-
en-Provence and 10.33 per cent of that of Toulouse while in 1784 they accounted for 13.27 per cent 
of Dijon dwellers (Gutton 1981, p. 73). 
Women were more numerous than men: of the 5,154 servants registered in the census, about 60 per 
cent (equal to 3,081) were women. These covered a wide range of age groups: those between 15 
and 30 accounted for 35 per cent, while more than 54 per cent was concentrated in the 31 to 60 year 
cohort27; in addition, 63.7 per cent were unmarried28 and more than 80 per cent were co-resident 
servants, living in the same house as the master29. This means that, as in other Italian cities, female 
service was a life-long condition, as witness the remarkable presence of unmarried women over 30 
years old (table no. 4). Since the average age of women at marriage at the beginning of the 19th 
century was 28.730, those aged above that were probably on their way to permanent celibacy and 
destined to be servants all their lives.  
 
Tab. 4. Age of unmarried female 
servants 
    % 
up to 10  9 0,5 
11 to 20 218 13,3 
21 to 30 485 29,6 
31 to 40 408 24,9 
41 to 50 216 13,2 
51 to 60 125 7,6 
over 60 79 4,8 
      
total 1638 100 
                                               
27 This is a feature of the urban Italian model, such as is also observed in other research. In Reggio Emilia, for 
example, in 1708 female servants aged over 30 accounted for 56 per cent of servants; in Rome, in the parish of San 
Damaso, in 1765 they made up 48 per cent. (Arru 1992, p. 276). 
28  Percentages are calculated on the whole population of female servants registered in the 1802 census – 
excluding those of unknown age and unknown marital status.  
29  Equal to 2,490 female servants out of a total of 3,081. 
30  According to the marriage acts of the Napoleonic age (1803-1814). 
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Nevertheless, are these features sufficient to conclude that in Turin girls did not work for their 
dowry? According to what has been explained in previous chapters, it is clear that long delay in 
payment and uncertainty concerning the moment at which couples would actually obtain the dowry 
were sufficient reasons to encourage young girls of the middle and lower classes to enter the labour 
market. In 18th century Turin life-cycle servanthood was not totally absent but rather a phenomenon 
that should be understood in the light of the events which affected the working life of women. 
Firstly, we should take into account the powerful attraction exercised by a capital city on the labour 
force from the countryside and the mountains for whom domestic service was one of the most 
attractive niches. Immigrant female servants were far more numerous than their Torinese 
counterparts: more than 75 per cent as against about 24 per cent31. We cannot exclude the 
possibility that for many of them their arrival in Turin coincided with the beginning of life-cycle 
servanthood. After a certain period, of course, many of them went back to their communities and 
got married there. For those who settled in Turin, on the other hand, the goal of getting married was 
not always attained, for two reasons. Firstly, too old to easily find a husband and too unskilled to 
find another job, they were obliged to stay in servanthood for their whole lives. Another possibility 
was that servants found good working conditions and the possibility of improving their rank and 
income in the home of their master and that this encouraged them to forgo marriage. In other words, 
it is quite probable that many servants started their career as a temporary job – and maybe with the 
idea of saving for a dowry - but that unfavourable or negative circumstances did not lead to 
marriage. On the other hand, when the servant got married, she declared the nature of her work 
without shame in their endowment act. Thus, for example, Francesca Varetta states that 60 lire of 
her dowry of 250 lire came from the salary she earned as a servant in the Opera del Deposito delle 
Convertite (a hospital for female Catholic novices)32; while Maria Margherita Mussa explains that 
all her dowry (225 lire) is the result of her work as a servant in Turin where she has lived without 
the help of her father33. These dynamics were strongly reinforced in the 19th century, when in 
numerous Italian cities the presence of women in domestic service increased and the image of the 
young girl arriving in the city to save for a dowry and find a husband became really common place 
                                               
31 Source: 1802 population census. See also: (Zucca Micheletto 2008, pp. 169-172). 
32 AST, Sez. Riun., Insinuazione di Torino, a. 1753, l. 11, ff. 705r-v. 
33 AST, Sez. Riun., Insinuazione di Torino, a. 1763, l. 12, ff. 393r-394r. 
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– although there were of course numerous examples of failure (Arru 1992; Pelaja 1988; Sarti 1997, 
2005, pp. 427-428). 
 Secondly, we should maybe take into account the possibility of looking for other working 
patterns in the lives of unmarried girls, since Ancien Régime Turin had a strong artisanal and 
manufacturing tradition. The Kingdom was one of the most important producers and exporters of 
raw silk – called organzino – while silk production was directly sponsored by government policy 
(Chicco 1995, 2002). In addition, since the royal court, the religious hierarchy and the wealthy 
families were all established in Turin, there was a great demand for luxury textile goods destined to 
decorate bodies, houses and churches. Women were numerous in artisanal activities and, as shown 
in the following table (tab. 5), the majority of unmarried girls up to 30 years old were employed in 
domestic service as well as in artisanal activities (each group accounting for more than 40 per cent). 
In the latter group seamstresses (242 of 762 artisans), silk weavers and other silk workers (138) and 
bonnet-makers (97) were included. 
 
Tab. 5 Labour force rate of unmarried girls (<= 30 
years old) in the sectors of the economy (1802) 
  n. % 
agriculture, farming 18 1,0 
artisanal activities 762 41,9 
trade, retail 78 4,3 
domestic service 779 42,8 
clerical works, liberal professions 37 2,0 
housekeepers 79 4,3 
generic day labourers 56 3,1 
religious 9 0,5 
  
total 1818 100,0 
 
 
Thus, the possibility that young, unmarried girls worked and accumulated resources before their 
marriage in these artisanal sectors is not negligible or unfounded, because all these artisanal 
activities required skills that could be learned from a young age.  
 
4. 1. Married women: a hidden labour force 
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  The second point that should be discussed is the link between the separate property regimes, 
the absence of a conjugal fund, and the presence of married women on the labour market. In the 
following pages I suggest that in dowry-system countries, such as 18th century Turin, married 
women’s participation was crucial and that dowry was not a sufficient reason to keep women out of 
the labour market.   
 As is well known from the literature on the topic, working married women, in southern as 
well as in northern Europe, are usually “invisible” in the documentation, and this makes it difficult 
to detect and evaluate their real presence in the labour market34. Indeed, in pre-industrial societies, 
cultural and educational models were based on the idea that work was not central to the female life-
cycle and that it should be limited to specific life-phases, especially before marriage. Work was 
regarded as less important than domestic activities and housekeeping; taking care of the children 
and of the house was considered the “natural” duty. In addition, civil officers charged with 
establishing population censuses – such as the one set up in Turin in 1802 – were not interested in 
married women’s work because they considered wives to be under the protection and care of their 
husbands. Instead, they paid special attention to spinsters' and widows' work, to how these women 
could “honestly” earn their living. Thus, archival sources rarely registered the work of married 
women and for a long time most scholars neglected it35. The results of this are evident. Out of a 
total of 8,088 couples recorded in the census, more than 81 per cent of wives did not declare a job 
as against 35 per cent of unmarried women aged 25 or over and 33 per cent of widows. Despite the 
difficulty in finding European evidence, quite high rates of wives not declaring a job have also been 
pointed out in Antwerp. According to the population census of 1796, 61.4 per cent of married 
women did not state a job compared to 8 per cent of unmarried women and 23.3 per cent of 
widows36. 
 In order to find evidence about married women’s work, I studied people recorded in the 
registers of the most important charitable institution in Turin during the 18th century, the Ospedale 
di Carità (Cavallo 1990, 1995). This gave relief to a great range of people in situations of economic 
difficulty: paupers, orphans, abandoned children, lonely and isolated people, couples and families 
                                               
34 On the topic see: (Zemon Davis 1986); (Groppi 1996); (Cavallo 2007); (Bellavitis, & Piccone Stella 2008); 
(Erickson 2008). 
35 Nevertheless, in recent years, research focusing on married women’s work has begun. See: (Groppi 1996); (Hunt 
1996); (Simonton 2005); (Van Den Heuvel, & Van Nederveen Meerkerk 2008); (Erickson 2008). About Turin see: 
(Cavallo 2007); (Zucca Micheletto 2008). 
36 My expansion from Table 51, p.118 of the Appendices to the PhD. of Anne Winter (Winter 2006-2007). I thank A. 
Winter for letting me consult her dissertation. 
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with numerous small children, widows and widowers. Poor or elderly people who could not work, 
ill and lonely people and orphans were housed in the institution itself; while families received 
external relief (rations of bread), and their babies were cared for by wet nurses paid by the hospital. 
As shown in the following table, in the second half of the century, 38 per cent of applicants were 
couples (5,690); while widows accounted for 20 per cent (2,979) and married women “without 
husband/abandoned”, 7 per cent (1,030).  
 
 
Tab. 6. People asking for relief at the Ospedale di 
Carità (1766-1792) 
    % 
couples 5690 38,1 
widows 2979 20,0 
widowers 1179 7,9 
married women without husband 1030 6,9 
married men without wife 89 0,6 
unmarried women 1031 6,9 
unmarried men 890 6,0 
abandoned children, foundlings 
and orphans 1185 7,9 
without indication 858 5,7 
      
total 14931 100 
 
 
It is important to underline that most of the families concerned were not beggars or vagrants; 
they were in a temporary situation of imbalance between resources and consumption due to having 
many small children who were not yet able to participate to the household economy, or because of a 
long illness or the unemployment of the partners. The goal was to help families to get through the 
critical situation; aid was temporary and was, moreover, aimed at encouraging individuals to get 
back to work or to find another job. The need to demonstrate a real contribution by all the members 
of the family towards the survival and well-being of the family compelled married women to state 
their job more frequently than in the population census. Out of a total of 5,690 couples, more than 
77 per cent of wives declared an employment, exactly the opposite of what emerges from the 
population census. As such, married women appear to be a hidden labour force, rather than being 
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absent from the labour market. This rate of female labour force – specifically married women - 
occurs also in other Italian cities, for example in four parishes of 18thcentury Bologna, where, 
according to a research of Maura Palazzi, 63 per cent of wives declared a job (Palazzi 1990, p. 364, 
tab. 2). Palazzi’s source is a partial census of Bologna inhabitants in 1796 and like the Turin 
Ospedale di Carità, the aim of the census was to organize charity relief for families. As a 
consequence, men’s and women’s work were carefully registered in order to evaluate their 
contribution to the domestic economy. 
 In addition, there is another difficulty involved in correctly evaluating the importance of 
women’s work: its informality and, in some respects, its ambiguity. Indeed, as has been explained 
in several studies37, women’s work has always been a mix of domestic and non-domestic work, 
formal and informal, paid and unpaid work. There is a great deal of other evidence strongly 
underpinning the important role of married women’s work in the household economy, not only in 
Turin and not only in the 18th century. Renata Ago for example, studying patrimonial trials in 17th 
century Rome, showed the importance of married women's contribution to the domestic economy 
compared to that of the husband (Ago 1996) while Anna Bellavitis reminds us that in 17thcentury 
Venice, artisans and merchants were careful in their wills to thank the wife for her work in the 
family shop or business and to leave bequests and gifts as a mark of gratitude (Bellavitis 2008).  
 A second factor suggests that the role and impact of married women’s work in Old Regime 
households should not be underestimated. As explained by scholars, uncertainty was a structural 
feature of the labour market of pre-industrial societies. Work was irregular and unstable; rhythms of 
work changed throughout year; production and consumption followed off-seasons and growing 
seasons (Grenier 1996; Zucca Micheletto 2009). The Turin economy was mostly based on silk and 
on luxury production and for this reason changes in fashion and tastes could appreciably lower 
consumption, as could as the introduction and diffusion of new exotic materials (e.g. cotton) 
(Chicco 1995). Changes in economic circumstances and crises could modify employment 
opportunities and promote a high level of labour force mobility. Thus, labour was not stable and 
periods of unemployment or mobility were frequent experiences for men and women. In this 
situation the earnings of both partners were necessary and strategically significant in assuring the 
survival of the family (Zucca Micheletto 2008, 2011). 
                                               
37 Evidence of this is provided for example by the research of Natalie Zemon Davis (Zemon Davis 1986), Angela 
Groppi (Groppi 1996), Sandra Cavallo (Cavallo 2007) and in a special issue of the revue Genesis. Rivista italiana 
delle Storiche. Flessibili/precarie (Bellavitis, & Piccone Stella 2008). 
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Conclusions  
 The aim of this paper was to analyse and discuss the relationship between the dowry system, 
marriage and family patterns and the labour market. As explained throughout the chapters, in 18th 
century Turin the endowment system did not encourage girls into early marriage; on the contrary, 
the comparatively high age of spouses characterizes this urban marriage pattern, particularly in 
specific economic and social groups, such as people involved in domestic service and immigrants. 
By law, dowry was often the girl’s portion of the family heritage but, in practice, as testified by 
conditions and timing of endowments as well as by the alienazioni dotali, its availability was the 
result of the spouses’ negotiation skills. As a consequence, since it could be manipulated by 
different actors, the dowry did not affect once and for all the women's destiny and the household 
formation. At the same time, of course, hesitations and delays in payment were serious reasons to 
encourage women – young unmarried girls as well as wives – to enter into and stay in the labour 
market. Firstly, work was crucial in order to save up a dowry and a trousseau which were essential 
to assure access to the marriage market. In this respect, the dowry was not only a girl's right; it was 
also a constraint due to which women could be strongly encouraged – and even compelled - to 
work. Secondly, in 18th century Turin several factors suggest that the paternalistic nature of the 
marriage relationship did not discourage married women from working. Although difficult to detect, 
this specific female labour force was crucial in ensuring the survival and the well-being of the 
household economy throughout several critical phases of the family life-cycle or during instability 
in the husband’s employment.  
 From a historiographical and methodological point of view, all this discussion allows us to 
analyse a wider question, namely the reliability of a northern/southern European pattern across the 
centuries and its geographical variability. The analysis of the relationship between marriage 
patterns, property regimes and the labour market presented here demonstrates the non-applicability 
and the non-pertinence of this model for 18thcentury Turin. On the contrary, it suggests the 
importance of a situational analysis in order to highlight the most appropriate and the most 
significant factors capable of explaining the socio-economic dynamics and phenomena in a specific 
context without in the process overlooking the complexity and the variety of European societies. 
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